In a recent celebrated breakthrough, Garg et al. (FOCS 2013) gave the first candidate for so-called indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) thereby reviving the interest in obfuscation for a general purpose. Since then, iO has been used to advance numerous sub-areas of cryptography. While indistinguishability obfuscation is a general purpose obfuscation scheme, several obfuscators for specific functionalities have been considered. In particular, special attention has been given to the obfuscation of so-called point functions that return zero everywhere, except for a single point x. A strong variant is point obfuscation with auxiliary input (AIPO), which allows an adversary to learn some non-trivial auxiliary information about the obfuscated point x (Goldwasser, Tauman-Kalai; FOCS, 2005). Multi-bit point functions are a strengthening of point functions, where on x, the point function returns a string m instead of 1. Multi-bit point functions with auxiliary input (MB-AIPO) have been constructed from composable AIPO by Canetti and Dakdouk (Eurocrypt 2008) and have been used by Matsuda and Hanaoka (TCC 2014) to construct CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes and by Bitansky and Paneth (TCC 2012) to construct three-round weak zero-knowledge protocols for NP.
Introduction
The obfuscation of a program should hide its inner workings while preserving the functionality of the program. Inspired by heuristic code-obfuscation techniques [CTL97] , obfuscation turned into a major research area of cryptography due to its manifold applications. The formal definition of Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation (VBB) demands that an obfuscated program is as good as a black-box that provides the same input-output behaviour as the program. Since the seminal paper of Barak et al. [BGI + 01, BGI + 12], we know that this strong notion of obfuscation is generally not achievable.
Hence, research focused on special-purpose obfuscators and, in particular, there are various positive results for obfuscating so-called point functions p x , that map all strings to 0, except for a single string x that they map to 1 [Can97, CMR98, Fis99, Wee05, HMLS07, CD08, DKL09, CKVW10, BC10, BP12]. Other positive examples include obfuscating re-encryption [HRsV07] and encrypted signatures [Had10] .
Point functions vs. point functions with multi-bit output. When considering point function obfuscation, we need to make a clear distinction between plain point functions such as p x which map every input to 0 except for the single input x that is mapped to 1 and point functions with multi-bit output (MBPF) such as p x,m where input x is mapped to string m. Obfuscators for plain point functions are constructed in [Can97, Wee05, HMLS07, DKL09] .
Another important distinction is, whether the adversary is given some "leakage" about x, socalled auxiliary information, as introduced by Goldwasser and Tauman-Kalai [GK05] . We note that the obfuscator by Canetti [Can97] also allow for auxiliary information about the point x to leak as long as x remains computationally hidden and the obfuscator by Dodis et al. [DKL09] allows for auxiliary information that hides the point statistically.
Although very similar, obfuscation schemes for MBPFs seem to be harder to construct than obfuscation schemes for plain point functions. Indeed, Canetti and Dakdouk initiated the study of obfuscation for MBPFs and showed that such obfuscation schemes are closely related to composable obfuscation schemes for plain point functions [CD08] . They show that obfuscators for MBPFs exist if composable obfuscators for plain point functions exist. Moreover, they show that composability is a non-trivial property. Both of these results carry over to obfuscation in the presence of auxiliary information, as long as the auxiliary information does not allow to recover the point. We refer to this type of auxiliary information as hard-to-invert or more specifically to computationally hard-to-invert.
Bitansky and Paneth [BP12] provide a clean treatment of auxiliary inputs and introduce the notion of point obfuscation with auxiliary input secure against unpredictable distributions (AIPO). Assuming composable AIPO they construct a three-round weak zero-knowledge protocol for N P. Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] extend the notion of AIPO to the multi-bit point function case (MB-AIPO) and show how to use it to build CCA-secure public-key encryption. We adopt the notions AIPO and MB-AIPO in this paper.
Indistinguishability obfuscation. Simultaneously to constructing task-specific obfuscation schemes, the quest for general obfuscators continued, and in a celebrated breakthrough [GGH + 13], Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai and Waters presented a candidate construction for indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation is weaker than VBB-obfuscation and assures that, for any two circuits that compute the same function, their obfuscations are indistinguishable. As Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] establish, this seemingly weak notion of obfuscation is actually the best possible notion of obfuscation. And indeed, the work by Garg et al. [GGH + 13] inspired simultaneous breakthroughs for hard problems in several subareas of cryptography [SW14, BCP14, ABG + 13, GGHR14, HSW14, BZ14, BST14, BM14] such as functional encryption, deniable encryption, two-round secure multi-party computation, full-domain hash, poly-many hardcore bits for any one-way function and more.
Contribution. In this paper we give both positive and negative results. We show that the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation contradicts the existence of multi-bit point function obfuscation in the presence of computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information (MB-AIPO), a notion which was built upon in [BP12, MH14] . That is, if indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then MB-AIPO does not exist and some of the results in [BP12, MH14] are based on a false assumption. ( We discuss the precise implications shortly.) Or, equivalently, if MB-AIPO exists, then indistinguishability obfuscation does not exist and all candidate assumptions are false [GGH + 13, PST14, GLSW14] . However, we do not have a candidate construction for MB-AIPO 1 , but we do have a candidate construction for iO. Therefore, given the current advancements in the understanding of indistinguishability obfuscation-for example, Gentry et al. [GLSW14] show in a very recent work that iO can be based on the Multilinear Subgroup Elimination Assumption thereby giving the first construction based on an instance-independent assumption-we consider the existence of iO to be more likely.
In summary, we derive the following negative results.
Theorem [informal] . If indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then MB-AIPO and hence composable AIPO do not exist.
Our proof is inspired by the result by Barak et al. [BGI + 01, BGI + 12]. Technically, they show that multi-bit output point functions cannot be VBB-obfuscated when "coupled" with a particularly chosen second function. Let p x,m be a multi-bit output point function that maps all strings to 0, except for the single point x which the function maps to the string m. Now, the second function is a test function T x,m that takes as input a circuit C and tests whether C(x) is equal to m. Now, if an adversary is given access to two oracles that compute p x,m and T x ,m then it cannot check whether the two functions "match", i.e., whether (x , m ) = (x, m). In turn, when given a circuit C that computes p x,m , the adversary can run T x,m on C and simply check whether T x,m (C) returns 1. Hence, the obfuscation of p x,m and the obfuscation of T x,m leak more information than two oracles for p x,m and T x,m thus establishing a counterexample for VBB obfuscation.
Although the starting point of Barak et al.'s result is a point function p x,m , they actually construct an unobfuscateble function that is a combination of the point function p x,m together with test function T x,m and thus their result is an impossibility result for general VBB obfuscation rather than an impossibility result for point function obfuscation.
In order to obtain a result for point function obfuscation based on the above idea, we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we think of the test circuit T x,m as "auxiliary information" [GK05] about the point function p x,m . Secondly, we do not use the "plain" test function T x,m but rather, based on indistinguishability obfuscation, we construct an obfuscated circuit that approximates the behaviour of T x,m .
Matsuda and Hanoaka [MH14] introduce MB-AIPO as follows. A first stage of the adversary B 1 defines a distribution over a point address x, a message m and auxiliary input z-we sometimes refer to the auxiliary input as "leakage". Now, a second stage of the adversary B 2 gets the leakage z as well as an obfuscation of the point function p x,m or an obfuscation of the point function p x,m , where m is drawn at random. The distinguisher B 2 tries to guess which of the two it received.
A multi-bit point function obfuscator is called secure, if for all efficiently computable distributions 2 B 1 , for the second stage of the adversary B 2 , given z, obfuscations of p x,m and obfuscations of p x,m are indistinguishable.
As such, the definition is not satisfiable, because B 1 can leak the pair (x, m) so that B 2 can check whether this pair "matches" the point function that B 1 received. Hence, we additionally require that B 1 be computationally unpredictable, that is, for all efficient predictors Pred, it holds that with high probability over (z, x, m) ←$ B 1 , given z, the algorithm Pred outputs x at most with negligible probability.
To recap, B 1 outputs a point address x, a point value m and some leakage z such that z hides the value x. Then, the second stage of the adversary B 2 receives z as well as an obfuscation of p x,m or an obfuscation of p x,m and needs to distinguish between the two. See Definition 2.9 for a formal definition.
Hence, to attack MB-AIPO, we need to define an adversarial distribution B 1 that is unpredictable and that returns some leakage z that allows B 2 to distinguish between obfuscations of p x,m and obfuscations of p x,m . Our adversarial distribution B 1 draws a random value x and a random value m. Moreover, as auxiliary information z, it will output a specially devised obfuscation that approximates the behaviour of the test function T x,m .
Given the circuit z and a multi-bit point function p, the second stage of the adversary B 2 outputs whatever the circuit z outputs when run on p. It distinguishes successfully between an obfuscation p of the "matching" multi-bit point function p x,m and the obfuscation p of a non-matching multi-bit point function p x,m .
We now explain how adversary B 1 constructs z. The hardness resides in constructing an obfuscation of the test function T x,m such that indeed, x is unpredictable given the description of the obfuscated test function. Towards this goal, we build on techniques developed by Brzuska, Farshim and Mittelbach [BFM14] who show a similar 1-out-of-2 result, namely that indistinguishability obfuscation and a large class of assumptions of the Universal Computational Extractor framework (UCE) [BHK13a] are mutually exclusive. We obfuscate the test function via indistinguishability obfuscation and prove that it is indistinguishable from an obfuscation of the zero circuit 0, the circuit that returns 0 on all inputs. As the zero circuit does not contain any information about x, indistinguishability obfuscation guarantees that likewise, an obfuscation of the test function T x,m hides x computationally.
In detail, let y be the output of a pseudo-random generator PRG when applied to m. The circuit z is an indistinguishability obfuscation of the following circuit C[x, y] with parameters x and y hard-coded. Circuit C[x, y] gets as input a circuit p, runs p on x and checks whether PRG(p(x)) is equal to y. If yes, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.
For simplicity, let us assume that the PRG is injective. Then, C[x, y] behaves exactly like the test function T x,m . Interestingly, and that is the key idea, we do not actually use m to compute the circuit C[x, y], we only need y = PRG(m). In particular, as PRG is a one-way function, y does not leak m. Moreover, as PRG is a pseudo-random generator, y does not even leak whether a pre-image m exists.
We will now use the PRG property to argue that an indistinguishability obfuscation of C[x, y] does not leak anything about x. Namely, if y is in the image of the PRG, then C[x, y] is equal to the test function T x,m . In turn, when y is not in the image of the PRG, then C[x, y] is the all-zero function. Due to the PRG security, these two distributions-C[x, y] when y is drawn as an output from the PRG and C[x, y] when y is drawn at random-are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, when the PRG has enough stretch, then with overwhelming probability, a random y is not in the image of the PRG, and hence, with overwhelming probability over a random y, the circuit C[x, y] is the all-zero circuit 0. For the two functionally equivalent circuits C[x, y] and 0, it holds that iO(C[x, y]) is computationally indistinguishable from iO(0). As 0 leaks nothing about x, we can argue that also iO(C[x, y]) leaks nothing about x and hence, x is unpredictable from the leakage of B 1 as required by the definition of MB-AIPO.
We note that our usage of the PRG is somewhat similar to the use by Sahai and Waters in their construction of a CCA-secure PKE scheme from iO [SW14] as well as the range-extension of Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] of a multi-bit point function to obtain shorter point values and the range-extension of a UCE1-secure hash-function by Bellare et al. [BHK13b] used to strengthen the impossibility result by Brzuska et al. [BFM14] .
To recap, we use the pseudo-random generator to hide m, and we use the indistinguishability obfuscation to hide x. Note that unpredictability in the MB-AIPO definition only requires that x is unpredictable from the leakage z. Therefore, hiding m might seem unnecessary. Interestingly, it turns out that this is not merely an artefact of our proof. Namely, we define a strong notion of unpredictability where x needs to be unpredictable from the pair (z, m), and we show that MB-AIPO can achieved under this definition, assuming plain AIPO in conjunction with iO.
Indeed, our negative results do not carry over to the setting of obfuscating plain point functions in the presence of auxiliary information, that is, to plain AIPO (assuming they are not composable 3 ). This is due the fact that we cannot apply the PRG to a function that only outputs a single bit.
Analogously, it looks unlikely that the result of Barak et al. [BGI + 01, BGI + 12] carries over to plain point functions, because it seems crucial that the point function p x,m has a multi-bit output m. Imagine that T x takes the circuit C as input and returns 1 if and only if C(x) = 1. Then, an adversary can perform binary search and recover x, even when only given access to T x and p x as oracles. 4 Hence, also their result does not carry over to standard point functions.
On the positive side, as hinted above, we show ways to work around our impossibility result. Firstly, note that Canetti et al. [CKVW10] introduce weaker versions of MB-AIPO that are not affected by our negative results. In particular, they use these weaker notions to build a symmetrickey encryption scheme that is secure in the presence of hard-to-invert leakage about the key. We strengthen their result insofar, as we present a notion that lies between their weaker versions of MB-AIPO and full MB-AIPO.
Our weak notion of MB-AIPO requires that the auxiliary information L computationally hides the point x even when given the corresponding point value m for some multi-bit point function p x,m .
This definition circumvents our impossibility result because we cannot use the security of the PRG anymore. In the proof of the impossibility result, we used that the circuit C[x, y] does not need m as a parameter and only needs y = PRG(m). In the presence of the value m, the reduction to the PRG-security does not carry through.
This argument merely shows that our proof fails. However, we provide positive evidence for the new security notion. Assuming AIPO and iO, we give a construction that achieves MB-AIPO for strongly unpredictable distributions. We show that this weaker notion of MB-AIPO is useful for applications. Based on our weak MB-AIPO construction, we build a public-key encryption scheme which is leakage resilient in the presence of hard-to-invert leakage of the key. Previously, such a result was only known for symmetric-key encryption [CKVW10] . We next discuss existing notions of multi-bit point obfuscation.
Notions of Multi-Bit Point-Obfuscation. Lynn et al. [LPS04] initiate the study of obfuscators for point functions with multi-bit output (MBPF) in the idealized random oracle model (ROM) and give a construction of a VBB obfuscator in the ROM. Though they do not explicitly introduce auxiliary information, it is easily seen that their construction allows for computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information. Canetti and Dakdouk [CD08] initiated the study of MBPFobfuscators in the standard model and showed that these exist if so-called t-composable obfuscators exist for plain point functions. Building on these results Canetti and Bitansky [BC10, BC14] show that the point obfuscator by Canetti [Can97] meets the requirements of a t-composable point function obfuscator down to a strong variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH), namely the t-strong vector DDH assumption. Note that the notion they achieve is the so-called notion of Virtual Grey-Box obfuscation (VGB)-the virtual grey box notion was introduced by Bitansky and Canetti [BC10, BC14] and allows the simulator to run in unbounded time-and not the stronger notion of VBB obfuscation. In [CKVW10] Canetti et al. show that obfuscators for MBPFs are closely related to symmetric encryption and that obfuscators for MBPFs secure in the presence of (certain types of) auxiliary inputs imply the existence of (certain types of) leakage resilient symmetric encryption schemes. Bitansky and Paneth [BP12] introduce a clean treatment of a form of auxiliary information which hides the obfuscated point computationally (AIPO) and Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] extend their notion to multi-bit output functions which is also the notion considered in this paper (MB-AIPO). Using composable AIPOs Bitansky and Paneth construct a three-round weak zero-knowledge protocol for N P based on composable AIPO [BP12] thereby circumventing a black-box impossibility result [GK96] . Matsuda and Hanaoka (MH, [MH14] ) introduce also an average case variant of MB-AIPO and a more restricted version of MB-AIPO which requires the auxiliary input to statistically hide the obfuscated point. They further study the relation between these average case MB-AIPO notions and the worst-case notions of point obfuscation, that is, virtual black-box and virtual grey-box. MH show how to construct CCA secure public-key encryption schemes from an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme using MB-AIPO with computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information, as well as, how to achieve CCA security starting from a CPA-secure lossy encryption scheme and using MB-AIPO with statistically hard-to-invert auxiliary information. In a very recent work, Canetti et al. [CFPR14] show how to build fuzzy extractors using t-composable point obfuscation secure in the presence of auxiliary information in the virtual grey-box setting. MH show that this form of point obfuscation implies MB-AIPO with respect to statistically hard-to-invert auxiliary information [MH14] , it is, however, not known if it can be shown to also imply MB-AIPO with computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information.
Our negative result shows that if indistinguishability obfuscation exists that MB-AIPO with computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information does not exist. This applies to the first of the two constructions of CCA secure PKE schemes by Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] as well as to the construction of a three-round weak zero-knowledge protocol for N P by Bitansky and Paneth [BP12] . 5 We leave as open problems, whether our negative results can be strengthened to encompass further uses of MBPF obfuscation or, whether the above constructions can be based on weaker notions of MBPF obfuscation not ruled out by our result.
Finally, we note that our result can be regarded as a random oracle uninstantiability result. One can show that the VBB obfuscator given by Lynn et al. [LPS04] is a secure MB-AIPO in the random oracle model, even if hard-to-invert leakage is allowed. Our results shows that, if indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then there is no hash-function that instantiates the random oracle securely according to this notion of security.
Point obfuscation and indistinguishability obfuscation. For our positive result, a construction of weak MB-AIPO and subsequently a construction of a leakage resilient PKE scheme, we combine AIPOs and indistinguishability obfuscation. In a recent work Brzuska and Mittelbach (BM, [BM14] ) show that combining these techniques allows to build powerful primitives and they give the first construction of a standard model hash function which is UCE secure for a non-trivial UCE notion which implies universal hardcore-functions and q-query correlated input secure hash functions. Furthermore, we note that our notion of weak MB-AIPO is inspired by the UCE notion introduced by BM: UCE security with respect to strongly unpredictable sources.
In a recent and independent work, Hofheinz constructs fully secure constrained pseudorandom functions [Hof14] in the random oracle model. A constrained PRF allows for the generation of keys that enable the holder to evaluate the PRF on a set of points but not on all points, and various forms have been suggested [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13] . In contrast to previous works Hofheinz uses point obfuscation and an extension he calls extensible testers-an extensible tester can be regarded as an obfuscation of a set of points Z which can be combined with a known set Z into a tester for set (Z ∪ Z )-in conjunction with indistinguishability obfuscation to hide which points a given key allows to honestly evaluate. This allows him to achieve full security without relying on complexity leveraging which was used in previous constructions entailing a superpolynomial loss of security in the adaptive setting. We note that unlike this work (and the work by BM) Hofheinz relies on the simpler assumption of plain point obfuscation (that is, obfuscation without auxiliary inputs) and shows how to build extensible testers based on the DDH-based point obfuscator by Canetti [Can97] .
Further 1-out-of-2 results. Indistinguishability obfuscation has led to many surprising breakthroughs in a number of sub-areas of cryptography [SW14, BCP14, ABG + 13, GGHR14, HSW14, BZ14, BST14, BM14]. Interestingly, the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation collides with the existence of other desirable primitives. If indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then it draws a fine line between what is possible and what is impossible, e.g., MB-AIPO and iO are mutually exclusive, but weak MB-AIPO can be build from iO (and AIPO).
If indistinguishability obfuscations does not exist, then 1-out-of-2 results are a promising way to prove such an impossibility result. In particular, it would be highly interesting to show a 1-out-of-2 result for iO and some other primitive for which we have a candidate construction, e.g., AIPO. Whether indistinguishability obfuscation exists or not, 1-out-of-2 results for iO help us explore the boundaries of what is possible. Either, they increase our understanding of iO, or they increase our understanding of other primitives.
Before our result, several 1-out-of-2 results have been established for iO. We already discussed the result by Brzuska et al. [BFM14] who show that iO is mutually exclusive with a large class of assumptions from the UCE framework [BHK13a] .
Interestingly, several notions of obfuscation are mutually exclusive with iO. Bitansky et al. [BCC + 14] show that iO implies the non-existence of average-case virtual black-box obfuscation with auxiliary input (AI-VBB) for circuit families with super-polynomial pseudo-entropy. In particular, AI-VBB obfuscation is impossible for all pseudo-random function families. Moreover, they show that indistinguishability obfuscation implies the non-existence of average-case virtual black-box obfuscation with a universal simulator for circuit families with a superpolynomial amount of pseudo-entropy. Bitansky et al. [BCPR14] show that if indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then for every extractable one-way function family there is an (unbounded polynomial-length) auxiliary input distribution L and an adversary A such that all extractors fail for A. Similar to our result for MB-AIPO, they embed an attack circuit into the auxiliary input. Boyle and Pass [BP13] strengthen this result under the assumption of differing-input obfuscation (diO). If diO exists, then the quantifiers can be reversed so that L does not depend on the one-way function family.
Also Garg et al. [GGHW14] show that differing-inputs obfuscation-a stronger form of indistinguishably obfuscation that was also introduced in the seminal paper by Barak et al. [BGI + 01, BGI + 12]-is mutually exclusive with some special-purpose obfuscator. As the particular special-purpose obfuscator that they consider seems to be a relatively mild assumption, we interpret their result as a conditional impossibility result for differing-inputs obfuscation. However, their result does not apply to indistinguishability obfuscation. In particular, recent results show how to improve the assumptions that underly indistinguishability obfuscation [PST14, BR14, BGK + 14, AGIS14, GLSW14] supporting its plausibility.
Auxiliary Input. Auxiliary input (AI) has been introduced by Goldwasser and Tauman-Kalai [GK05] and the specifics of how AI is modeled are very important when it comes to the (im)possibility of notions of obfuscation. Notably, for extractable one-way functions, the aforementioned results by Bitansky et al. [BCPR14] show that, assuming iO, this notion of security is impossible under unbounded AI, but possible when the length of the AI is bounded by a fixed polynomial that is known a priori. Potentially, bounded AI-for example, if the amount of AI is restricted to be less than the size of an MB-AIPO-could also be used to circumvent our iO-based impossibility result while preserving a reasonably wide range of applications.
Moreover, one can consider independent AI rather than dependent AI, which would also help to circumvent our impossibility result. However, AI is usually useful for composition where partial information about the obfuscated circuit/point is leaked to the outside and thus, dependent AI is often quite powerful in applications. However, even security under independent AI is non-trivial to achieve. Assuming iO, Bitansky et al. [BCC + 14] show that a large class of functions cannot be VBB-obfuscated in the presence of independent AI.
A further possibility to circumvent our impossibility result is to consider a statistical notion of unpredictability rather than computational unpredictability. Statistical unpredictability has already proved useful for the construction of q-query secure correlation-secure hash functions [BM14] and CCA secure PKE schemes [MH14] .
While in the VBB-setting AI is a strong notion that corresponds to the existence of a universal simulator [BCC + 14], in the VGB-setting AI is trivial. That is, it is equivalent whether one considers VGB security with AI or without AI. The reason is that the VGB simulator is unbounded and hence able to compute the best AI itself [BC10] . Secure AIPOs in the VGB-setting imply AIPOs with statistically hard-to-invert leakage [MH14] . Our result does not rule out composable AIPOs in the VGB-setting, and indeed, this assumption has been used very recently by Canetti et al. [CFPR14] to build computationally secure fuzzy extractors that work for classes of sources that have more errors than entropy.
In light of the subtle modeling of AI, it remains to investigate whether those results in [BP12] and [MH14] that use an assumption which is mutually exclusive with iO can be based on an alternative assumption that is compatible with iO. Towards this goal, one might consider our weakened notion of MB-AIPO or model AI in a way that circumvents our result. Finally, it would then be interesting to come up with candidate assumptions for such a notion of security.
Conclusion and future work. We show that indistinguishability obfuscation and MB-AIPOthat is, MB-AIPO as used in [BP12, MH14] and with computationally hard-to-invert auxiliary information-are mutually exclusive. It remains to investigate whether the positive results in [BP12, MH14] can be salvaged through weaker notions of MB-AIPO or, perhaps, when combining AIPO and iO in a similar way as we did in Section 4 to receive our positive result for weak MB-AIPO. We note, however, that, at a first glance, it is not straightforward to base the applications in [BP12, MH14] on our weakened notion of MB-AIPO. 6 On the other hand, one might ask whether our negative result can be extended to showing that AIPO and iO are mutually exclusive. Currently, we do not know whether this is possible. We consider such a result to be a highly interesting finding and suspect that it would require different techniques than the ones we use. Our result implies directly that differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) and MB-AIPO are mutually exclusive. Perhaps, using different techniques, one might be able to first show that diO and AIPO are mutually exclusive, for example, by showing that we can instantiate the special-purpose obfuscator by Garg et al. [GGHW14] using AIPO.
We hope that our work sparks further interest in studying the connections between iO/diO on the one hand and notions of (multi-bit) point obfuscation on the other hand. More generally, we believe that it is an interesting question to identify notions of security that collide with indistinguishability obfuscation and we expect more results of that flavor in the future.
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter, which all algorithms get implicitly and in unary representation 1 λ . By {0, 1} we denote the set of all bit-strings of length , and by {0, 1} * the set of all bit-strings of finite length. The length of x is denoted by |x|. If x, y ∈ {0, 1} * are two bit strings of the same length, then we denote their inner product over GF(2) by x, y . For a finite set X, we denote the action of sampling x uniformly at random from X by x ←$ X, and denote the cardinality of X by |X|. We call a randomized algorithm efficient or PPT if it runs in time polynomial in the security parameter. We assume algorithms to be randomized, unless explicitly stated differently. If A is randomized then by y ← A(x; r) we denote that A is run on input x and with random coins r and produced output y. If no randomness is specified, then we assume that A is run with freshly sampled uniform random coins, and write this as y ←$ A(x). We often refer to algorithms, or tuples of algorithms, as adversaries. If E is an event then we denote by Pr[ E] its probability and if X is a random variable, we denote its expectation by E[ X]. We say a function
If we speak of an ensemble or a family {C λ } λ∈N of circuits, denoted by a calligraphic letter such as C, we mean that C λ contains a set of circuits for each security parameter λ ∈ N. We speak of a sequence of circuits {C λ } λ∈N to denote a non-uniform circuit, that is, one circuit for every security parameter. By a distribution or an ensemble of distributions D = {D λ } λ∈N we identify a function ensemble {f λ : S λ → [0, 1]} λ∈N with corresponding set S λ that assigns each element in S λ a probability weight in [0, 1] such that x∈S λ f λ (x) = 1 for all λ ∈ N. We consider only efficiently sampleable distributions D by which we mean that a (possibly non-uniform) algorithm Sam λ exists that on input a uniformly random string r outputs a value in S λ according to distribution D λ , that is, such that for all λ ∈ N and
We often say we "run" a distribution or we simply write D λ (1 λ ) to denote that the corresponding sample algorithm is invoked on fresh random coins.
Obfuscation. Obfuscation has been extensively used within cryptography and it comes in many different flavors. We now present the various definitions that we use in this paper. We start by recalling the strongest definition of virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation with auxiliary inputs due to [BGI + 01, GK05, BGI + 12].
Def inition 2.1 (Worst-case obfuscator with auxiliary input (VBB-AI)). A PPT O is a worst-case obfuscator with auxiliary input for an ensemble C = {C λ } λ∈N of poly-size circuits if it satisfies:
• Functionality. For any λ ∈ N and C ∈ C λ , O(C) is a circuit which computes the same function as C, that is, for all x it holds
• Virtual black-box. For any PPT adversary A there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N, C ∈ C λ and z ∈ {0, 1} poly (λ) :
where the probability is taken over the coins of A, Sim and O. • Correctness. For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ C λ , and for all inputs x we have that
• Security. For any PPT distinguisher D, for all pairs of circuits C 0 , C 1 ∈ C λ such that C 0 (x) = C 1 (x) on all inputs x the following distinguishing advantage is negligible:
Differing-inputs obfuscation. Differing-inputs obfuscation is closely related to indistinguishability obfuscation and also goes back to the seminal paper of Barak 
Def inition 2.4 (Differing-inputs obfuscation). A PPT algorithm diO is a differing-inputs obfuscator for a differing-inputs distribution Sam (for circuit ensemble {C λ } λ∈N ) if the following holds:
• Correctness. For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ C λ , and for all inputs x we have that Pr C (x) = C(x) : C ←$ diO(1 λ , C) = 1.
• Security. For any PPT distinguisher D, for any (C 0 , C 1 , z) ←$ Sam(1 λ ) the following distinguishing advantage is negligible:
Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] show that any general indistinguishability obfuscator is also a differing-inputs obfuscator for certain classes of circuits. That is, any indistinguishability obfuscator for all circuits in P/poly is a also a differing-inputs obfuscator for distributions over pairs of circuits that differ on at most polynomially many inputs. We recall their Theroem: Pr |{x :
Then iO is a differing-inputs obfuscator for ({C λ }, Sam).
Point obfuscation. Besides the general purpose indistinguishability obfuscator we consider obfuscators for the specific class of so-called point functions. A point function p x for some value x ∈ {0, 1} * is defined as
In this paper, we consider a variant of point function obfuscators under auxiliary input which was first formalized by Canetti [Can97] . We here give the definition from [BP12] presented in a game based formulation. The first definition formalizes unpredictable distributions which are in turn used to define obfuscators for point functions.
Def inition 2.6 (Unpredictable distribution). A distribution ensemble D = {D λ = (Z λ , X λ )} λ∈N , on pairs of strings is unpredictable if no poly-size (non-uniform) circuit can predict X λ from Z λ . That is, for every poly-size circuit sequence {C λ } λ∈N and for all large enough λ:
Remark. Alternatively, we could use a variant of Definition 2.6 for uniform distributions D. Jumping ahead, we note that our negative result, Theorem 3.1 also carries over to uniform distributions. Theorem 2.5 by Boyle et al. [BCP14] holds for both, uniform and non-uniform samplers. For our construction of weak MB-AIPO in Proposition 4.5, AIPO for non-uniform samplers yields weak MB-AIPO for non-uniform samplers, and AIPO for uniform samplers yields weak MB-AIPO for uniform samplers. Likewise, for Proposition 5.3, weak MB-AIPO for non-uniform samplers yields a leakage-resilient PKE secure against non-uniform adversaries, while weak MB-AIPO for uniform samplers yields a leakage-resilient PKE secure against uniform adversaries. For ease of presentation, we omit the explicit treatment of uniform and non-uniform adversaries.
Def inition 2.7 (Auxiliary input point obfuscation for unpredictable distributions (AIPO)). A PPT algorithm AIPO is a point obfuscator for unpredictable distributions if on input (z, x) it outputs a polynomial-size circuit that returns 1 on x and 0 everywhere else and satisfies the following secrecy property: for any (efficiently sampleable) unpredictable distribution B 1 over {0, 1} poly(λ) × {0, 1} λ it holds for any PPT algorithm B 2 that the probability that the following experiment outputs true for
The probability is over the coins of adversary (B 1 , B 2 ), the coins of AIPO and the choices of For an MBPF p x,m we call x the point address and m the point value. Similar to AIPO we can define MB-AIPO via an unpredictable distribution-the notion was introduced by Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] in an average case formulation called AIND-δ-cPUAI-where the distribution outputs a tuple (x, m) (defining a point function p x,m ) together with auxiliary information z. We require that it be computationally infeasible to recover the point address x given auxiliary information z. Thus, in the MBPF setting we define the unpredictable distribution as D = {D λ = (Z λ , X λ , M λ )} λ∈N but still require that the point address (aka., x) remains hidden given the auxiliary input. From an MB-AIPO obfuscator we now require that the obfuscation of p x,m is indistinguishable from an obfuscation with a changed point value m where m is chosen uniformly at random. Intuitively this captures that the obfuscation does not reveal any information about the point value m. We note that also other definitional choices are possible here, which we discuss after presenting the formal definition. We now state unpredictability for a distribution over triples (z, x, m) and then give the formal definition of MB-AIPOs.
That is, for every poly-size circuit sequence {C λ } λ∈N and for all large enough λ:
Def inition 2.9 (Auxiliary input point obfuscation for unpredictable distributions (MB-AIPO)). A PPT algorithm MB-AIPO is a multi-bit point obfuscator for unpredictable distributions if on input (z, x, m) it outputs a polynomial-size circuit that returns m on x and 0 everywhere else and satisfies the following secrecy property: for any (efficiently sampleable) unpredictable distribution B 1 over
it holds for any PPT algorithm B 2 that the probability that the following experiment outputs true for (B 1 , B 2 ) is negligibly close to 1 2 :
The probability is over the coins of adversary (B 1 , B 2 ), the coins of AIPO and the choices of x, m 0 , m 1 and b.
Definition 2.9 was used in [MH14] and is implied by the notion of composable AIPO [CD08] that is used in [BP12] 7 . Interestingly, an MB-AIPO as by the above definition is not necessarily also AIPO secure. For this note that given an obfuscation scheme MB-AIPO we can construct an MB-AIPO such that MB-AIPO (x, m) works like MB-AIPO, but additionally, it leaks a hardcore bit of x by outputting a string r and the inner product of x and r. The harcore bit does not hurt the security of MB-AIPO as an MB-AIPO, yet given this single bit of information on x an adversary in the AIPO security game can trivially win.
There are two immediate alternative definitions of MB-AIPO that come to mind. One could modify the MB-AIPO definition by requiring that the obfuscation of point function p x,m is indistinguishable from an obfuscation of p x ,m . That is, instead of only adapting the point value, we could conceive a notion in which the honest obfuscation should be indistinguishable from one where both the point address and the point value are chosen uniformly at random. A second alternative would be to require that the obfuscation of point function p x,m is indistinguishable from an obfuscation of p x ,m . This gives us three alternatives:
where the first alternative corresponds to our Definition 2.9. We note that the second and third alternative are easily seen to imply also AIPO. However, the third alternative allows the obfuscation to leak large portions of m which goes against the intuition of what MB-AIPO wants to model. In Section 3, we show that, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation exists, neither of the three definitions can be met. Throughout the paper, the term MB-AIPO refers to Definition 2.9 unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Average-case point obfuscation and statistical unpredictability. The notions for point obfuscation as defined above is over arbitrary high-entropy distributions over the point address. Instead, one could consider a slightly weaker variant where the point address is sampled according to the uniform distribution. Indeed, Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] recently presented constructions of CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes based on this version of point obfuscation. They call AIPO with arbitrary high-entropy samplers a worst-case notion, and AIPO with the uniform distribution an average-case notion and denote it by AIND-δ-cPUAI. Our impossibility result also applies to AIND-δ-cPUAI which we refer to as average case MB-AIPO.
A second avenue to weaken the security requirements of point obfuscators is to require that the auxiliary input needs to hide the point address statistically. We call unpredictable distributions for which this is the case statistically unpredictable. Our impossibility result does not carry over to this notion.
IO Implies the Impossibility of MB-AIPO
In the following we present our negative result, namely that indistinguishability obfuscation and multi-bit point function obfuscation in the presence of auxiliary information (MB-AIPO) are mutually exclusive. This holds for MB-AIPO as defined in Definition 2.9 as well as for the two alternative definitions discussed below the definition. We discuss implications of our result in Section 3.2.
IO and MB-AIPO are Mutually Exclusive
Multi-bit point obfuscation with auxiliary inputs is a powerful primitive and has, for example, been used to construct CCA-secure encryption schemes [MH14] and to circumvent black-box impossibility results for three-round weak zero-knowledge protocols for N P [BP12] . Our following result says that, if indistinguishability obfuscation and pseudo-random generators exist, then MB-AIPOs (as defined in Definition 2.9) cannot exist. The result remains valid even if we consider average case MB-AIPOs (where point address x is chosen uniformly at random). Technically our result builds on techniques used by Brzuska, Farshim and Mittelbach (BFM; [BFM14] ). BFM show a similar 1-out-of-2 result, namely that if indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then certain kinds of UCEsecure hash functions-a hash function security notion recently introduced in [BHK13a]-cannot exist [BFM14] . In the UCE-framework, a hash function H gets a hash key hk and an input x and outputs y. BFM obfuscate the circuit (H(·, x) = y), that given a hash-key hk checks whether hk "matches" the pair (x, y), that is, whether H(hk, .) maps x to y. They show that, if |hk| < 2 |y|, then it is likely (in the corresponding experiment) that the circuit is the 0-circuit that outputs 0 on all inputs and hence, the indistinguishability obfuscation of this circuit does not leak x.
We will use a similar technique to hide the point address. In order to break AIPO with indistinguishability obfuscation, we need to show that, given the auxiliary input, it is hard to recover the point address, but that, given the auxiliary input and the point function, one can distinguish. Similarly, for UCEs, one needs to show that, given some leakage about x and y, it is hard to recover x, but that, given the leakage and the hash-key hk, one can distinguish whether y was generated by applying H(hk, .) to x or whether y was drawn at random.
Showing that an indistinguishability obfuscation hides a certain value is usually the crux in proofs involving iO. For this, we construct a new technique which may be of independent interest and is given as Lemma 3.2.
Theorem 3.1. If indistinguishability obfuscation exists for all circuits in P/poly, then average-case obfuscation for multi-bit point functions secure under auxiliary input (MB-AIPO) does not exist.
This theorem applies to Definition 2.9 and all the three variants that we discuss below that definition. It also applies to the average-case version where the point address is sampled uniformly, because our adversary samples both, x and m uniformly at random.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we use indistinguishability obfuscation to construct an unpredictable distribution B 1 together with an adversary B 2 that, given leakage from the unpredictable distribution can distinguish between point obfuscations from the unpredictable distribution and point obfuscations from the uniform distribution.
We first give the unpredictable distribution B 1 which takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and outputs two values x, m together with some auxiliary information (resp. leakage) z. Here leakage z will be the indistinguishability obfuscation of a predicate circuit that takes as input a description of a circuit C, evaluates the circuit on a hard-coded value x, runs the result through a pseudo-random generator PRG and finally compares this result with some hard-coded value y. That is, we consider the circuit C[x, y](·) := iO PRG(uC(·, x)) = y ,
where uC denotes a universal circuit taking as input a circuit description C of a fixed length and a value x and which outputs C(x). This use of a PRG allows us later to argue that if value y is chosen uniformly at random that with high probability it falls outside the image of the PRG and thus the circuit is 0 on all inputs, that is, it implements the zero-circuit 0.
We next formally define the unpredictable distribution. For this let n and be two polynomials and let PRG : {0, 1} n(λ) → {0, 1} 2n(λ) be a pseudo-random generator with stretch 2. Note that we do not need to additionally assume the existence of PRGs as AIPOs (and in particular MB-AIPOs) already imply one-way functions. 8 Let, furthermore, uC(·, x) be a universal circuit that on input a description of a circuit C and value x outputs C(x). Adversary B 1 computes an unpredictable distribution over (z, x, m) as follows:
We now present the adversary B 2 that, given the leakage z from B 1 , breaks the security of the multi-bit point obfuscator. We then argue that B 1 , indeed, implements an unpredictable distribution. Adversary B 2 gets values p and z as input, where p is either a point obfuscation of p x,m sampled according to B 1 or an obfuscation for p x,u for a uniformly random value u. Adversary B 2 computes z(p) and outputs the result. If p is an obfuscation of p x,m , then B 2 computes the predicate function PRG(p x,m (x)) = y where y was computed as PRG(m). Thus, it will always output 1. If, however, p is an obfuscation of p x,u , then with overwhelming probability over the choice of u, adversary B 2 returns 0, because PRG-security implies that for any fixed value, the probability that PRG(u) is equal to that value for a random u, is negligible. It follows that (B 1 , B 2 ) break the security of the obfuscator with overwhelming probability. We now prove that (B 1 , B 2 ) is also a valid pair of adversaries, that is, that B 1 is an unpredictable distribution. In the following lemma, we show that, under the assumption of indistinguishability obfuscation, the leakage computed by B 1 is indistinguishable from an obfuscated zero circuit 0 the circuit that returns 0 on all inputs and which is padded to have the same length as the (unobfuscated) leaked circuit, that is, the circuit (PRG(uC(·, x)) = y). As the zero circuit does not leak any information about y, the leakage is unpredictable.
Lemma 3.2. Let n, , t be polynomials. For x ∈ {0, 1} (λ) , let uC(·, x) be a universal circuit that on input a description of a circuit C ∈ {0, 1} t (λ) and value x outputs C(x).
If PRG : {0, 1} n(λ) → {0, 1} 2n(λ) is a pseudo-random generator and iO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for all circuits in P/poly, then for all efficient PPT distinguishers Dist there exists a negligible function negl such that Pr Dist 1 λ , iO PRG(uC(·, x)) = PRG(m) = 1 − Pr Dist(1 λ , iO(0)) = 1 ≤ negl (λ) where 0 denotes the constant zero circuit padded to the same length as circuit (P RG(uC(·, x)) = PRG(m)). The first probability is over the random choice of x and m and the coins of iO and Dist and the second probability is over the coins of iO and Dist.
Proof. We bound the distinguishing probability in Lemma 3.2 with the security of the PRG and the indistinguishability obfuscator iO. We consider the following hybrids (which are also depicted in Figure 1 ):
Game 1 : The game chooses a random value m and computes y ← PRG(m). It constructs the predicate circuit C x,y ← (PRG(uC(·, x)) = y) and an obfuscationC = ←$ iO(C x,y ). It then calls distinguisher Dist on inputC and outputs whatever Dist outputs.
Game 2 : As before, except that the game chooses a uniformly random value y. It constructs the predicate circuit C x,y ← (PRG(uC(·, x)) = y) and an obfuscationC = ←$ iO(C x,y ). It then calls distinguisher Dist on inputC and outputs whatever Dist outputs.
Cx,y ← (PRG(uC(·, x)) = y) Game 3 : As before, except that the game terminates if there there exists a circuit description C ∈ {0, 1} t (λ) such that C x,y (C) = 1. We denote this event by (x, y) ∈ Bad(λ) if for values (x, y) such a circuit description C exists.
Game 4 : As before, except that now an obfuscation of the constant zero-circuit (padded to appropriate length)C ←$ iO(0) is constructed.
We bound the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 by the security of the PRG. Game 2 and Game 3 are, by the fundamental lemma of the game-playing technique [BR06] , identical until event Bad(λ) occurs. We now prove that Bad(λ) only happens with negligible probability. For a uniformly random pair of values (x, y) we have that the probability that there exists circuit C such that PRG(uC(C, x)) = y is upper bounded by the probability that y is in the image of the PRG. As the PRG maps n(λ) bits to 2n(λ) bits, the probability that a random y is in the image of the PRG is upper bounded by 2 −n (λ) .
Finally, we bound the difference between Game 3 and Game 4 by the security of the indistinguishability obfuscator iO by noting that if (x, y) / ∈ Bad(λ) then circuit C x,y encodes the constant zero circuit. We now explain this formally.
Firstly, let us externalize some of the variables that the games use and introduce a unified notation for Game 3 and Game 4 . For i ∈ {3, 4}, let Game i [x, y](λ) be equal to the game Game i (λ) where the game chooses values x and y. We define A[x, y](C) to be an adversary against the indistinguishability obfuscator iO that gets a circuit C as input, where C is either an obfuscation of circuit C x,y or an obfuscation of the constant zero circuit 0 padded to the length of circuit (PRG(uC(·, x)) = y). Adversary A[x, y](C) runs distinguisher D on input (1 λ , C) and outputs whatever D outputs.
If Note that x and y are chosen such that (x, y) / ∈ Bad (λ) . Due to the linearity of expectation we can further rearrange this as 
Implications
Average case MB-AIPO is a relaxed notion of virtual-black-box point obfuscation in the presence of auxiliary input and in particular implied by it [MH14] . Consequently our impossibility result also shows that VBB obfuscation of multi-bit point functions secure in the presence of auxiliary input cannot exist if indistinguishability obfuscation exist:
Corollary 3.3. If indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then VBB multi-bit point obfuscation secure with auxiliary input does not exist.
We note that VBB multi-bit point obfuscation is also often referred to as Digital Lockers.
Canetti and Dakdouk [CD08] study the composition of point function obfuscation and show that composable AIPO implies the existence of composable MB-AIPO. And hence, applying our result we get the following corollary. Several results have been based on the existence of MB-AIPO (or composable AIPO). Matsuda and Hanaoka give a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme based on MB-AIPO [MH14] and Bitansky and Paneth give a three-round weak zero-knowledge protocol for N P based on composable AIPO [BP12] . 9 In Section 4 we present a weakened notion of MB-AIPO that we deem to fall outside our impossibility result. It is not clear whether this weaker notion suffices for the applications in [BP12, MH14] and such a proof is not straightforward, so it remains to study whether other weak variants of MB-AIPO could be used.
A random oracle uninstantiability. Lynn et al. [LPS04] construct VBB obfuscators for multi-bit point functions in the idealized random oracle model and their result can easily be seen to encompass auxiliary information. Thus, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation exists our result rules out the existence of a standard model hash function that can instantiate the random oracle in their construction. 
On Circumventing our Impossibility Result
Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] present a CCA-secure PKE scheme that is based on MB-AIPO and, thus, is ruled out by our impossibility result, if indistinguishability obfuscation exists. However, they also present a version of a CCA-secure PKE scheme based on the weaker assumption of MB-AIPO that is secure only with respect to statistically unpredictable distributions. Indeed, our techniques do not carry over to ruling out MB-AIPO for statistically unpredictable distributions, because the way in which we use indistinguishability obfuscation, inherently relies on computational security. Switching to a statistical notion of security was also proposed for UCEs in order to salvage a large number of applications [BFM14, BHK13a] .
Moreover, Canetti et al. [CKVW10] present notions of MB-AIPO in the setting of computational unpredictability that are not affected by our impossibility result. In the following section, we present a variant of MB-AIPO that is stronger than theirs but weaker than the definition that we show to be impossible. Namely, we strengthen the assumption on unpredictable distributions to remain unpredictable even in case the point value m is given. We call this notion strong unpredictability and, indeed, give a construction based on AIPO and indistinguishability obfuscation. An analogous notion of unpredictability has recently been introduced by Brzuska and Mittelbach in the context of UCE security [BM14] .
Weak MB-AIPO from iO and AIPO
In this section we show that, despite the negative results from the previous section, point obfuscationin particular AIPO-and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) together make a powerful team. Our first observation is that we can use iO to construct a point obfuscation scheme which can securely obfuscate point functions given as input the point function, rather than the point address. This is inherently different from all previous point obfuscation schemes [Can97, CMR98, Fis99, Wee05, CD08, CKVW10, BC10, BP12] which always take the point address as input. We call this sort of obfuscator point-independent as the obfuscator works independently of the actual point (in fact it may be computationally infeasible for the obfuscator to recover the point from its input). Using a similar technique we then construct a mild form of a multi-bit point function obfuscation scheme secure in the presence of auxiliary input that we call weak MB-AIPO. Later, in Section 5, we use our construction of weak MB-AIPOs to construct a public-key encryption scheme that is leakage resilient with respect to any computationally hard-to-invert leakage of the secret-key.
Point-independent Point Function Obfuscation
Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] introduce the notion of best-possible obfuscation. Intuitively an obfuscator is a best-possible obfuscator if an obfuscation leaks as little information about the original program as any functionally equivalent circuit. In the context of point functions this means that a best-possible obfuscator for point functions (or for more general function classes) on input a point function p x would need to output an obfuscated point function which is at least as good as an obfuscation produced by, for example, an AIPO obfuscator on input the point address x. Goldwasser and Rothblum show that if we consider PPT obfuscators, then the notions of best-possible obfuscation and indistinguishability obfuscation are equivalent [GR07] . Let us recall the definition of best-possible obfuscation:
Def inition 4.1 ([GR07]: Best-possible obfuscation). A PPT O is a best-possible obfuscator for an ensemble C = {C λ } λ∈N of families of poly-size circuits if it satisfies the preserving functionality and polynomial slowdown properties as in Definition 2.1, and also has the following property (instead of the virtual black-box property).
• Computational best-possible obfuscation. For any polynomial size learner L, there exists a polynomial size simulator Sim such that for every large enough input length λ, for any circuit C 1 ∈ C λ and for any circuit C 2 ∈ C λ that computes the same function as C 1 and such that |C 1 | = |C 2 | it holds for any PPT adversary A that
Thus, if iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for all circuits in P/poly, then the mapping C → iO(C) yields a point-independent point function obfuscator since the indistinguishability obfuscation of point function p x must not leak more about x than what can be extracted from the "best possible" point-obfuscation scheme on input x. Furthermore, if AIPO exists, then a best possible point obfuscation is at least as good as AIPO and hence, our construction yields a point-independent obfuscation scheme that is secure in the presence of auxiliary inputs.
Weak MB-AIPO from AIPO and iO
In the following we give a relaxed definition of MB-AIPO and subsequently give a construction based on plain AIPO and indistinguishability obfuscation. We weaken the original MB-AIPO definition (Definition 2.9) by requiring that an obfuscation must only be secure for unpredictable distributions that hide the point address even given the the point value m. We call this notion of unpredictability strong unpredictability and note that an analogous notion has recently been introduced in the context of UCE security [BM14] . If we restrict adversaries to strong unpredictability we yield an MB-AIPO notion that we call weak MB-AIPO.
Def inition 4.2 (Strongly unpredictable distribution). We say that a distribution ensemble D = {D λ = (Z λ , X λ , M λ )} λ∈N , on triples of strings is strongly unpredictable if no poly-size (non-uniform) circuit family can predict X λ from (Z λ , M λ ). That is, for every sequence of poly-sized circuits {C λ } λ∈N and for all large enough λ:
Def inition 4.3 (Weak MB-AIPO). A PPT algorithm AIPO is a weak multi-bit point obfuscator if it is a MB-AIPO for strongly unpredictable distributions.
Next, we present our construction of a weak MB-AIPO scheme. The idea will be to use a plain AIPO (for the point address x). We then construct a circuit which evaluates the AIPO and outputs m if, and only if, this evaluation returns 1. The construction will be the indistinguishability obfuscation of that circuit. Proposition 4.5. If AIPO exists and if iO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator for all circuits in P/poly then the above construction is a weak MB-AIPO.
Proof. Consider an adversary (B 1 , B 2 ) against the weak MB-AIPO property of MB-AIPO where B 1 implements an unpredictable distribution, that is, on input the security parameter it outputs a point function description (x, m) together with some auxiliary information z. We proceed to proof the result in three hybrid steps where the first game is identical to the MB-AIPO game where adversary B 2 receives an honest obfuscation of point function p x,m and the last game is identical to the MB-AIPO game where the adversary receives an obfuscation of point function p x,m for a uniformly random m : We, thus, need to show that the difference between the above games is negligible. For the difference between games Game 1 and Game 2 we consider the following claim. Assume this is not the case. Then there exists an extractor Ext that on input (C[p x , m], 0, z) outputs a target value τ (with noticeable probability) such that C[p x , m](τ ) = 0(τ ) and, hence, τ = x. We will use this extractor to break the security of the AIPO scheme, that is, we construct (A 1 , A 2 ) as an adversary against the security of AIPO. Adversary A 1 runs B 1 to receive point function description (x, m) and auxiliary information z. It chooses a random value r and computes b ← r, x . It outputs (x, (z, m, r, b)). Adversary A 2 gets as input a (z, m, r, b) and a point function obfuscation p which is either an obfuscation for p x or for p u for a uniformly random u. It constructs circuits C[p, m] and the constant zero circuit 0 and runs extractor τ ←$ Ext(C[p, m], 0, z). If τ = ⊥ it flips a bit and outputs it. Else, if τ = ⊥, then p(τ ) = 1 and, hence, value τ is either equal to x or to u. In this case adversary A 2 outputs 1 if τ, r = b and 0 otherwise.
Analysis. Let us denote by the probability that Ext outputs a value τ = ⊥ in the differing-inputs game. Then, if τ = x adversary A 2 will always output 1 as, by construction, x, r = b. If, on the other hand, τ = u, then adversary A 2 will output 1 only with probability 1 2 as u and r are randomly chosen values and r remains hidden from Ext. Thus, our adversary has a distinguishing advantage of 1 2 . In the following we make this intuition formal. We note that our simulation technique is inspired by Brzuska and Mittelbach [BM14] who build variants of UCE security based on puncturable PRFs, iO and AIPO and that the formal analysis is almost taken verbatim.
Let us denote by d = 0 the event that in the AIPO-game, the honest point function p x gets obfuscated, and let d = 1 describe the event that in the AIPO-game, p u gets obfuscated for a random value u. Let further be the probability that Ext returns a value τ = ⊥ in the differing-inputs game, that is, := Pr[ ⊥ = Ext | d = 0 ] (note that the in the differing-inputs game the obfuscated point function is always p x ). For readability we will drop the inputs given to adversaries Ext and A 2 in the following formal treatment. We can now consider the distinguishing probability of our adversary A 2
Let U denote a random variable describing the choice of point function p u (in case d = 1) and note that u is chosen from {0, 1} λ .
If extractor Ext outputs a value u (given that d = 1), then the probability that A 2 outputs 1 (
where random variable R denotes the choice of value r by A 1 to compute b = r, x * . Note that extractor Ext is independent of R and b and, thus,
This establishes that adversary A 2 is able to distinguish with noticeable probability since, by assumption, the success probability of extractor Ext is noticeable.
It remains to show that A 1 implements an unpredictable distribution. Note that B 1 is strongly unpredictable (cp. Definition 4.2) and hence point x remains computationally hidden given values z and m. As r is a uniformly random value chosen independently of x and b is a single bit which can be guessed it follows that, indeed, A 1 implements an unpredictable distribution.
This concludes the proof of Claim 4.6. ♦
We next show that with Claim 4.6 it follows that games Game 1 and Game 2 are negligibly close. Boyle et al. [BCP14] show that every indistinguishability obfuscator is also a differing-inputs obfuscator for circuit families that differ on at most polynomially many points (we give their result as Theorem 2.5 on page 12). As the circuits considered in Claim 4.6 differ only on a single point it follows that their obfuscation under an indistinguishability obfuscator are computationally indistinguishable and hence games Game 1 and Game 2 are negligibly close.
For games Game 2 and Game 3 , the analysis is analogous. The only difference consists in m being chosen at random. Thus, we can make use of Claim 4.6 with the sample adapted to output circuit C[p x , m ]. This concludes the proof.
A second construction. In the next section we will construct a leakage resilient public-key encryption scheme, for which we will need an extended construction of MB-AIPO that we present next. Namely, we prove that the construction is still secure if, additionally, we return the AIPO of x. Intuitively, that should not harm security, because, given an MB-AIPO for (x, m), it is easy to construct an AIPO for x. However, making this statement formal requires some care. We next show that also this adapted construction fulfills the security properties of a weak MB-AIPO scheme.
Proof. We proceed by the following game hops where the first is identical to the MB-AIPO setting where the adversary (B 1 , B 2 ) gets an honest obfuscation of point function p x,m and the last is identical to the dual setting where it gets as input an obfuscation of p x,m for a uniformly random point value m . Game 2 : As before, but instead of returning p x , that is the obfuscation of coming from the construction, we construct a fresh point obfuscation of x. Hence, the adversary B 2 gets as input ((iO(C[p x , m]), AIPO(x)), z).
Game 3 : Instead of returning AIPO(x), we return AIPO(u) for a random point u, that is, the adversary B 2 gets ((iO(C[p x , m]), AIPO(u)), z).
Game 4 : Instead of returning iO(C[p x , m]), we return iO(C[p x , m ]) for a random m , that is, the adversary B 2 gets ((iO(C[p x , m ]), AIPO(u)), z).
Game 5 : Instead of returning AIPO(u) for a random point u, we return AIPO(x), that is, the adversary B 2 gets ((iO(C[p x , m ]), AIPO(x)), z).
Game 6 : Instead of returning a fresh point obfuscation of x, we return p x , that is, the adversary B 2 gets ((iO(C[p x , m ]), p x ), z).
Note that the last game corresponds to the MB-AIPO-game where the point value is chosen uniformly at random. Hence, it suffices to show that the six games are computationally indistinguishable.
Game 1 to Game 2 . We reduce to the security of the indistinguishability obfusactor iO. Note that the two circuits p x (given to the adversary in Game 1 ) and AIPO(x) (given to the adversary in Game 2 ) are functionally equivalent as they are two independently generated obfusactions of point function for point x . Let (B 1 , B 2 ) be a distinguisher between Game 1 and Game 2 . Then, we construct an adversary against the security property of obfusactor iO analogously to the final game hop of the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Game 2 to Game 3 . We reduce to the distinguishing advantage between games Game 2 and Game 3 to the security of the point obfuscation scheme AIPO. Let (B 1 , B 2 ) be a distinguisher between Game 2 and Game 3 . Then, we construct an adversary (D 1 , D 2 ) against AIPO as follows: D 1 runs B 1 to obtain (z, (x, m)). It runs p x ←$ AIPO(x), computes C ←$ iO(C[p x , m]) and returns ((z, C), x).
That is, the auxiliary input returned by D 1 is (z, C). D 2 receives (p, (z, C)) as input and runs B 2 on ((C, p), z), that is, on multi-bit point function (C, p) and auxiliary information z. D 2 outputs whatever B 2 outputs. If p is AIPO(x), then the input distribution to (B 1 , B 2 ) is as in Game 2 . If p is AIPO(u), then the input distribution to (B 1 , B 2 ) is as in Game 3 . Hence, if (B 1 , B 2 ) is successful, then so is (D 1 , D 2 ). It remains to show that (D 1 , D 2 ) is a valid adversary against AIPO, that is, that D 1 is unpredictable. This follows from the strong unpredictability of B 1 and the security of AIPO, that is, given a predicator P against the strong unpredictability of D 1 , we will either construct an adversary against the security of AIPO or a predictor R against the strong unpredictability of B 1 .
Let P be a predictor against the unpredictability of D 1 . Then, we construct R against the strong unpredictability of B 1 as follows: Adversary R gets as input (z, m) where z is the auxiliary information generated by B 1 and m is the point value output by B 1 . It draws a random point v and runs p v ←$ AIPO(v), C ←$ iO(C[p v , m]). It then runs predictor P on input (C, z) and outputs whatever P returns. We now need to argue that P produces the right output, although v is used in the generation of C and not x as expected by P. We reduce the difference in P's behavior to the AIPO security.
Assume that P has non-negligible probability of returning x when getting (iO(C[p x , m]), z), but not when getting (iO(C[p v , m]), z). Then, we construct an adversary (D 1 , D 2 ) against the AIPO security as follows. Adversary D 1 runs B 1 to get (z, (x, m)). It draws a random string r and sets bit b to be the inner product of r and x, that is, b ← r, x . Adversary D 1 outputs ((z, m, r, b), x), that is, its leakage is (z, m, r, b). Now, D 2 gets (z, m, r, b) as well as a point function p as input. It runs the predictor P(iO(C[p, m], z)) to obtain some value x . It tests whether p(x ) = 1 and if this is not the case it returns a random bit. If p(x ) = 1, then it returns 1 if and only if the inner product of r and x is equal to b, that is, it returns r, x . Now, to see that (D 1 , D 2 ) breaks the security of AIPO, we first show that it is a valid adversary, i.e., that D 1 is unpredictable and then analyse the success probability. Adversary D 1 is unpredictable because B 1 is strongly unpredictable and because b is a single bit that can be guessed. Let us turn to the success probability of (D 1 , D 2 ). The formal treatment is identical to the advantage computation within Claim 4.6. We now give the intuition behind the success probability of (D 1 , D 2 ). If p is a point obfuscation of p x , then P returns x with non-negligible probability ν and in these cases, D 2 returns 1 with probability 1, because the bit always matches. Thus, if p is a point function of p x , then D 2 returns 1 with probability ν + (1 − ν) · 1 2 = 1 2 + ν 2 . If p is a point obfuscation of a random point p v , then, independently of the behaviour of P, D 2 returns 1 with probability 1 2 . Hence, the success probability is non-negligible.
Game 3 to Game 4 . We reduce to the MB-AIPO security of Construction 4.4 that we established in Proposition 4.5 . Let (B 1 , B 2 ) be an adversary that distinguishes between Game 3 and Game 4 , where B 1 is strongly unpredictable. We construct an adversary (D 1 , D 2 ) against the weak MB-AIPO property of Construction 4.4 as follows. D 1 runs B 1 and outputs whatever B 1 outputs. D 2 gets (C, z). It draws a random value u and computes p ←$ AIPO(u). It then runs B 2 on ((C, p), z) and outputs whatever B 2 outputs. D 1 is strongly unpredictable, because B 1 is. Moreover, the simulation is perfect. Hence, the advantage of (D 1 , D 2 ) is identical to the advantage of (B 1 , B 2 ).
Game 4 to Game 5 . Analogous to the game hop from Game 2 to Game 3 .
Game 5 to Game 6 . Analogous to the game hop from Game 1 to Game 2 .
Leakage Resilient Public-key Encryption
In this section, we will use the construction of weak MB-AIPO to build a leakage resilient publickey encryption scheme. Our result is inspired by Canetti et al. who show that multi-bit point obfuscation is tightly connected to symmetric encryption [CKVW10] . They give an intriguingly simple construction of a symmetric encryption scheme from an MB-AIPO as follows. Encryption under key k is defined as Enc k (m) := MB-AIPO(k, m). Correspondingly, decryption interprets the ciphertext as a circuit and runs it on the key, that is, Dec k (c) := c(k). Furthermore, they show how to build an MB-AIPO scheme from symmetric encryption. They classify the relationships between the two primitives depending on the strength of the MB-AIPO and encryption scheme, respectively. In particular, they show that a version of MB-AIPO obfuscation implies the existence of a symmetric key encryption scheme secure in the presence of leakage (of the key) with the only requirement that the leakage computationally hides the secret key.
Let us recall a somewhat simplified version of their notion of semantic security of a symmetric encryption scheme with weak keys and auxiliary inputs: 3. The output of the game is the output of A. Figure 2 : The IND-CPA game for public-key encryption schemes with hard-to-invert key leakage. An adversary is deemed admissible if it is PPT and if the output of A0 computationally hides the key, that is, secret key sk has super-logarithmic min-entropy given z. We improve the result by Canetti et al. by building a leakage-resilient encryption scheme, that is public key rather than symmetric key. We first present the variant of IND-CPA security with hard-to-invert key-leakage of a public-key encyption scheme E that we consider (we give the pseudocode in Figure 2 ). In the IND-CPA game with adversary (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) an initial adversary A 0 takes as input the secret key and outputs some leakage z. Adversary A 1 is run on input the public key pk and leakage z and outputs a single messages m together with some state st. Then, according to a secret bit b either message m or a uniformly random message m of the same length is encrypted yielding ciphertext c which is given together with state st to the final adversary A 2 which needs to guess bit b. 10 Correctness of the scheme follows from the correctness criteria of indistinguishability obfuscation and AIPO. We reduce IND-CPA security of the scheme to the security of weak MB-AIPO (note, that an encryption is nothing but an obfuscation following Construction 4.4).
IND-CPA
Proposition 5.3. If Construction 4.7 is a weak MB-AIPO, then Construction 5.2 is IND-CPA secure in the presence of computationally uninvertible leakage on the secret-key.
Proof. Assume that there exists a successful adversary A 0 , A 1 , A 2 . We are going to construct an adversary B 1 , B 2 against MB-AIPO.
Adversary B 1 selects a random point x and runs adversary A 0 on input the security parameter and x to receive some leakage z. It constructs an AIPO obfuscation pk ←$ AIPO(x) and runs adversary A 1 on input (1 λ , pk, z) to receive a message m and state st. It outputs ((x, m), st). Adversary B 2 gets as input an obfuscation c that is either equal to MB-AIPO(x, m) or equal to MB-AIPO(x, m ) as well as state st. It runs adversary A 2 on input (1 λ , c, st) and outputs whatever A 2 outputs.
Analysis. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we show that if A 0 , A 1 , A 2 is successful, then so is B 1 , B 2 . Then, we prove that B 1 implements a strongly unpredictable distribution as required for weak MB-AIPO.
To see that B 1 , B 2 are successful, we observe that the simulation is perfect. It remains to show that B 1 implements a strongly unpredictable distribution. We reduce to the unpredictability of A 0 . Let P be a predictor against the strong unpredictability of B 1 , then we construct a predictor R against the unpredictability of A 0 .
R receives the leakage z that was created by A 0 . It draws a random point u and sets pk ←$ AIPO(u). Then, the predictor R runs A 1 on (z, pk) to obtain a message m and some state st. It runs P on (m, st) to get a value x and returns x . Now, A 1 gets as input AIPO(u) instead of AIPO(x). We argue that, assuming the security of AIPO, P is also successful on this distribution. Assume that P has non-negligible probability ν in returning x when A 1 is run on (z, AIPO(x)), but negligible probability ν in returning x when A 1 is run on (z, AIPO(u)) for a random u. Then, we construct an adversary (C 1 , C 2 ) against AIPO as follows. Adversary C 1 runs A 0 to create (z, x). Then, C 1 draws a random string r and sets b to be the inner product of r and x, that is, b = r, x . Adversary C 1 returns ((z, r, b), x). The second stage C 2 gets ((z, r, b), p) and runs A 1 on (z, p) to obtain a message m and some state st. It runs P on (m, st) to get a value x . It checks whether p(x ) = 1. If no, it returns a random bit. If yes, then it returns 1 if and only if the inner product of x and r is equal to b.
Firstly, the first stage C 1 is unpredictable because A 0 is and b is only a single bit of x. Now, let us see that (C 1 , C 2 ) are also successful. If p is a point obfuscation of x, then P returns x with probability ν and thus, C 2 returns 1 with probability ν + (1 − ν) · 1 2 . If p is not a point obfuscation of x, then, indepdently of the behaviour of P, C 2 returns 1 with probability 1 2 thus yielding an overall advantage of ν 2 . The formal treatment is identical to the advantage computation within Claim 4.6. This concludes the proof.
